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Abstract 
This paper provides an historical analysis of the four privatization stages of the Russian economy 
covering the period 1986-2005 with particular attention to the initial period of private capital 
formation. We use data from the World Bank, the Russian Accounting Chamber and other 
publicly available sources to reveal how government policy − or lack of it − led to the emergence 
of privately owned companies, including enforcement agencies for property right protection with 
business-criminal relationships. Our analysis shows that the ultimate effect of privatization has 
been the transfer of ownership from the state to a few industry-based monopolistic structures 
with highly concentrated capital and unstable governance. Analyzed within the framework of 
new institutional economics, this paper provides a foundation for ongoing research on current 
Russian corporate ownership structures, capital formation and financial market development. 
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1.  Introduction 
Strong ideological positions of different interest groups, and often misleading or inaccurate 
reporting, make economic analysis of the Russian transition a complex task. The outcomes are 
still debatable. The large-scale privatization programme in Russia was motivated by political and 
economic objectives intensified by a fiscal crisis1. This paper provides an analysis of the four 
privatization stages of the Russian economy to date with particular focus on the initial period of 
private capital formation.  
 
The state economy of the Soviet Union was privatized quickly and massively in the absence of 
relevant legislation and supporting institutions. General criticism of the privatization reforms 
may be well summarised as a case of: ‘Economics taking the law for granted’ in the words of 
Avinash Dixit (2004, p.3)2. The accompanying emergence of organised crime in the early 1990s 
represents one possible institutional response to guard the rights of new private owners. 
 
The consequences of privatization will influence the Russian economy for many years ahead. 
How corrupt the privatization was and what will be the dynamics of transition to a fully 
developed market economy may only be understood in the framework of institutional economics 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 1996, 2000). In this framework the process of privatization is 
interpreted not only as transfer of property rights from government to the private sector, but also 
as a fundamental process for the development of legal institutions and financial markets. 
 
Throughout such a transition the primitive financial sector must play an increasingly important 
role, replacing that of government in mobilizing resources for investment and in exercising 
                                                 
1 The fiscal crisis was characterised by unsustainable government budget deficits, high taxation and burdensome 
funding. 
2 The influence of A.K. Dixit’s 2004 book Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Models of Governance, 
Princeton University Press, is reflected in the title of this paper. 
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financial discipline. Recourse to external finance by private firms was promoted in Russia by 
fostering the development of capital markets and the financial sector itself in an attempt to make 
finance external to firms more easily available. The investment activity of Russian enterprises is 
one of the least studied topics in the development of the Russian economy due to the lack / 
inconsistency of data sources. The main source of corporate financing has been enterprises’ 
retained earnings. Company equity has been used primarily to upgrade production facilities and 
technologies through active use of ADRs3. Intercompany loans have also been used widely in 
both private and large state companies. Borrowed funds (bank credits) have practically not been 
used to finance investment projects. Foreign investments have been associated mostly with 
foreign companies which created production facilities in Russia from scratch. The issue of bonds 
by corporations has been used in some cases to raise long-term, but mainly foreign, capital. In 
fact the Russian financing model, built around using company equity and own revenues, differs 
significantly from both the Anglo-American (public stock) and German (bank loan) models. The 
current trend of major Russian companies to attempt to raise capital internationally may indicate 
a growing demand for the rule of law provided by global financial markets4. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The main section, 2, describes the privatization of Soviet state 
enterprises, government ministries, financial and distributional institutions in four stages defined 
by the dominating economic processes or changes in law. The overall dynamics of privatization 
and estimates of the proceeds of privatization to government are collected from a variety of 
sources and presented in Section 3. Section 4 gives an account of unprecedented criminal 
activities as a response to lacunae in legal and economic governance and a summary of Russian 
legal reforms in the framework of the new institutional economics (Williamson, 2000). Section 5 
concludes. 
                                                 
3 American depositary receipts (ADRs) have been extensively used by Russian companies for secondary listing in 
the US.  
4 There are 39 Russian companies that have undertaken IPOs in the 10 years to September 2006. 
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2.  Major Stages of Privatization in Russia 
The four phases of privatization in Russia are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. The four phases of privatization 
Period Stage Economic processes 
1986 – 1990 Latent privatization Creation of “youth economy”; initial 
accumulation of capital; formation of first 
commercial banks; transformation of ministries 
into conglomerates. 
1991 – 1994 Public mass 
privatization. 
Voucher auctions 
Development of private banking sector and 
financial market infrastructure; mass 
privatization of small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
1995 – 1998 Monetary (“loans for 
shares”) privatization 
 
Privatization of large companies in strategic 
sectors of the economy (oil, gas, metallurgy, 
telecoms); emergence of vertically integrated 
financial-industrial groups  
1999 – 2005 Post-reform ownership 
concentration 
 
Further development of market infrastructure 
and creation of oligopolistic financial-
industrial groups  
 
Russian privatization of state-owned enterprises had several political and economic objectives: 
(i) reducing the government’s role in the economy by forming a wide class of private owners 
who would support the ongoing economic reform, (ii) raising investment capital for industry, 
(iii) increasing the efficiency of firms, (iv) exposing firms to greater competition and market 
discipline, (v) re-structuring the state-owned natural resource monopolies, (vi) raising revenue 
for the government, (vii) reducing government subsidies and (viii) attracting foreign investment. 
Furthermore, capital market development has been an explicit objective of privatization in 
Russia5. 
                                                 
5 Presidential Decree “On the State Programme of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises” issued 7 July 
1991.Vedomosti S’ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR and Supreme Council of RF, 1991, 27:927; 
Federal Law of RF # 1531-I “On Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in Russian Federation" issued 3 July 
1991. Vedomosti S’ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR and Supreme Council of RF, 1992, 28: 1614, Chapters 5, 9, 10 
and 11; 
Changes to the Federal Law # 2930-I "On Privatisaion of State and Municipal Enterprises in Russian Federation" issued 5 
June 1992. Vedomosti S’ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR and Supreme Council of RF, 1992, 28: 1614;  
Presidential Decree # 2284 “On the State Programme of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises” issued 24 
of December 1993. 
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The social economic dilemma associated with privatization in Russia was that state enterprises 
were very large and, at the time, neither companies nor individuals had enough capital to 
purchase a stake in their ownership. In Stiglitz’s words “there were no legitimate wealth holders 
to buy the assets” (Stiglitz, 1999, p.39). 
 
Advocates of privatisation appealed to the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) which states that under 
perfect competition and zero transaction costs all government allocations of property are equally 
efficient, because interested parties will bargain privately to correct any externalities. Therefore, 
giving employees and managers privileged access to shares of state enterprises appeared to be 
the easiest medium by which to privatize. Despite understanding the legal and law enforcement 
impediments, reformers expected that “institutions would follow private property” and assumed 
that the economy would make the transition “from legal structures that enforce contracts to 
regulatory structures that make a financial system work” (Stigliz 1999, p.55; Stiglitz, 2000, 
p.58). 
 
2.1.  Stage 1: Latent Privatization (1986-1991) 
The development of embryonic pro-market structures in Russia took place behind the scenes in 
the late 1980s and has been studied little if at all. Most authors who analyse Russian privatization 
study the publicly announced privatization of 1991-1996 (see e.g. Clarke, 1992; Aslund, 1995). 
However, it is these spontaneous processes of property distribution which turned out to provide 
initial capital that led to the emergence of the ‘oligarchs’ and the formation of large industrial 
financial groups (FIGs). 
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Russia’s path to a market economy originated with the setting up of Youth Scientific and 
Technical Innovation Centres (YSTICs). In its Statute dated 25 July 1986 the Communist Party 
permitted these Centres to “conclude contracts” with enterprises “on a self-financing basis” and 
pay the contractors later in cash. This freeing up of cash from enterprises started an inflationary 
process which has not been documented in the literature but is well remembered by ordinary 
Russians. 
 
The YSTICs were given exceptional privileges when doing business − the right to engage in 
foreign trade, customs benefits, etc. These Centres were created as self-financing organisations 
with the exclusive right to intermediate between state enterprises and “innovative collectives” 
that wanted to make money performing research work for the enterprises6. Moreover, such joint 
ventures were relieved from income and profit taxes and did not have to pay for the use of 
production facilities that belonged to the Centres.7 Technically, the process operated as follows: 
an enterprise made a non-cash transfer of a specific amount of money to the YSTIC in return for 
services. The YSTIC then retained from 18% in 1987 to 33% in 1990 of the sum of the contract 
and the profits were used to develop the Centre’s business. 5% of the commission was remitted 
to the YSTI Coordination Councils - affiliated with Communist party structures 
(Kryshtanovskaya, 2002). 
 
According to White (1996) by the spring of 1990, approximately 600 YSTI Centres and more 
than 17,000 student cooperatives were doing business in the country. Together they involved 
about 1 million people and 4,000 economic formations of various types under Communist Youth 
League Committees, including the Centre of International Cooperation “Olimpietz”, All-Russian 
                                                 
6 State enterprises in the USSR could not legally make use of their funds outside of governmental planned activities 
in the extant five year plan. Bank credits played a purely artificial role in paper transactions between state 
enterprises.  Employees’ rates of remuneration were strictly regulated by the state and no other source of income 
was possible besides a regular salary.  
7 Documents of the Central Committee of Communist Youth League, 1989, pp. 184-186. 
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Aerospace Association “Vako” (1988), “YUNEX” Foreign Trade Organisation, a Youth 
Commercial Bank “Dair” (1991), Youth Ecological Centre (1989), etc. 
 
The scope of the centres was broadened considerably after adoption of the “Law on 
Cooperatives” in May 1988, allowing them to engage in the manufacture of consumer goods and 
to establish economic relations with foreign organisations. They were exempt from all customs 
duties and could set their own prices for imported goods. Zadorin (1989) documented that in two 
years the 27 Moscow-based YSTICs signed contracts for a total value of 240 million roubles. 
Thus, Volgograd YSTIC “Progressor”, employing 2,000 people, was involved in research and 
design works to the Ministry of Fuel and Gas with a total volume of contracts of more than 6 
million roubles in 1988. The volume of work performed in 1988 to 1990 grew exponentially by 
as much as 60% monthly (Bunin, 1990). The most rapidly developing YSTICs were “Azot” 
under the Ministry of Chemical Fertilizers, “Orbita-Service” and “Photon” under the Ministry of 
Industrial Means of Communication, “Menatep” under the Moscow Frunzensky District 
Committee of the Communist Party (with L. Nevzlin, M. Khodorkovsky as chairmen) and many 
others. 
 
After the abolition of benefits8 at the end of 1991, young entrepreneurs, having accumulated 
initial capital, formed a class of private owners in such profitable spheres of entrepreneurship as 
international trade and tourism, construction, the media and financial services.9  
 
Once the youth economy privatization model’s economic efficacy had been convincingly 
demonstrated, the ‘state’ started to privatise itself. These early stages of hidden privatization took 
                                                 
8 Federal Law No. 2116-1 of the Russian Federation of December 27th, 1991, 'Concerning Tax on the Profit of 
Enterprises and Organisations'. Instruction No. 34 of the State Tax Service of the Russian Federation of March 16th, 
1990, 'Concerning Taxation of the Profit and Income of Youth Legal Entities'.  
Resolution of the XXI Congress of the Youth Communist League (April 1990) “On mechanism of management of 
property formed by the Youth Scientific Centres” that came into force in February 1991. 
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place without any announcement under the full control of state officials. The most important 
were the transformation of the system for managing the economy, privatization of the 
distribution and banking systems, and privatization of some of the most profitable enterprises. 
During this period, the first large private corporations were formed to replace ministries, 
exchanges and trade houses were created to replace the State Distribution Committees and the 
first commercial banks were set up. For example, Tyazhenergomash replaced the Ministry of 
Heavy, Energy and Transport Machine Building with the former minister, V. Velichko, 
becoming its CEO; Atommash replaced the privatised Ministry of Nuclear Energy and the 
former Deputy Minister V. Mikhailov became head of the company. Similarly, in 1989 the 
former minister V. Chernomyrdin became Chairman of the Gazprom — the privatised Ministry 
of the Gas Industry.10 During the same period, the extremely large Russian companies such as 
Diamonds of Russia and Energomashexport were created from former state owned industries. 
Another natural resources concern, “Norilsky Nickel” was formed from six metallurgical plants 
by a resolution of the Council of Ministers (dated 4 November 1989) which aimed at 
restructuring the whole non-ferrous metallurgy industry. Privatisation of the concern took place 
later in 1994.  
 
The privatization of a number of profitable production facilities also belongs to this period − 
Butek Machinery Holding Company in 1989, led by Mikhail Bocharov, a member of the 
Supreme Council, the ZIL and KamAZ automobile plants in August 1990, and Stroipolimer in 
1990. 
 
Before the reforms of 1988-1990 there existed a monobank system in the USSR represented by 
the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank. The State Bank, in turn, controlled six specialised 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 See the highlighted entries in Appendix 1 which developed through the YSTIC system. 
 
10 “Modern Political History of Russia (1985-1998)”. Book 1. Chronicle and Analytics. Moscow. RAU-
Korporaciya. 1999, pp. 79-85; 
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banks: Vneshtorgbank – financing government foreign transactions, the Bank for Foreign 
Economic Activity (Vneshekonombank) − responsible for the foreign debt of the USSR, the 
Industrial Construction Bank (Promstroybank) − providing loans to industrial  enterprises; the 
Agricultural Industrial Bank (Agroprombank) – financing agricultural producers; the Bank for 
Housing and Communal Services (Zhilsotsbank) – financing of housing and communal services 
objects; the Savings Bank (Sberbank) - providing services to the general public. Each specialized 
bank had thousands of branches throughout the country, however only Sberbank performed cash 
operations. 
 
A number of the first commercial banks were formed through the privatization of former 
specialised state banks. In 1991 Promstroybank, Zhilsotsbank and Agroprombank were 
transformed into joint-stock banks. The Moscow Industrial Bank, the Moscow Interregional 
Commercial Bank, Promstroybank of Russia and Promstroybank of St. Petersburg were all 
created from the Promstroybank. Unicombank, Mosbiznesbank, Sverdlsotsbank and others came 
from Zhilsotsbank system. The owners of these new commercial banks, formed from territorial 
subsidiaries of specialised banks, were their former management and major customers. 
 
Besides the former specialised banks, some new banks were created due to their founders’ strong 
links to the political elite — Russian Credit (1990), Menatep(1988), Inkombank (1988), 
Mostbank(1991), Credobank (1989), and others (see Appendix 1). As a rule the clients of the 
new banks were state organisations. During the latent privatization of 1988-91, the struggle for 
clients was fierce, since managing cash flow in accounts was a highly profitable area of business 
in conditions of incredibly high inflation rates and instability of the rouble exchange rate.  
 
Various Government Ministries’ financial divisions were also transformed into commercial 
banks, with the Head of a Ministry’s financial department becoming Chairman of the Board. One 
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of the largest banks at that time, Bank Imperial, was created on 28 December 1990 (register 
number 1315) by the Ministry of Finance, and its Chairman, S. Rodionov, was previously the 
head of one of the Ministry’s departments11. In a similar manner, Avtobank, Neftekhimbank, 
Promradtekhbank and other industrial banks had already appeared12. Interestingly, the three 
largest banks – Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and Vnesheconombank − remained the property of the 
state. Appendix 1 gives the list of commercial banks registered in 1988-89. 
 
The privatization of the distribution systems (Gossnab − The State Committee for Distribution) 
was done by creating the first exchanges, Moscow Commodities Exchange and Moscow Central 
Stock Exchange and trade houses. A number of joint enterprises were established by the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet Committee for Foreign Economic Contracts.  
 
This first period of latent privatization took place quite painlessly, since the process was based 
not on laws adopted by parliament, but on government decrees that transferred the property 
rights to authorized economic agents. The barter trade of power for property was the most 
actively used method. State officials established commercial structures to suit their own needs 
and eventually got themselves assigned there to run the businesses. So, the early market 
development in Russia was a period of initial capital accumulation for only a privileged few and 
was a process of property redistribution. At the end of this first period the new owners of the 
emerged businesses immediately started to consolidate their capital. Without doubt there were 
elements of non-observance of existing laws and lack of overall control of the process.  
 
                                                 
11 Source: The Central Bank of Russia official website (Department of Public Affairs) 
http://www.cbr.ru/press/arxiv/980827_1646_lik04.htm 
12 Avtobank: Registration number 30, Date of registration 06.12.1988; Neftekhimbank: Registration number 38, 
Date of registration 28.12.1988; Promradtekhbank: Registration number 228, Date of registration 17.01.1990. 
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2.2.  Stage 2: Mass Privatization (1991-1994) 
The publicly announced privatization started in November 1991 by removing the restrictions on 
the establishment of small businesses (cooperatives). The federal law "On privatization of state 
enterprises in Russian Federation" (dated 3 July 1991 with amendments in June 1992) was 
further supported by presidential decrees, government resolutions and a three-year privatization 
programme regulating the process.13 These laws foresaw the so called ‘small’, ‘voucher’ and 
‘money’ privatization schemes. 
 
Small privatization referred to all minor businesses, such as shops and restaurants, which would 
now be sold or leased with the right of complete buyout by their employees. Large and medium 
sized state enterprises were to be transformed into joint-stock companies with the government 
initially retaining control by owning a stake of shares to be sold later. Some shares were given 
away to the workers and management. Notably the natural resource monopolies, such as oil, 
nuclear power and telecommunications, were excluded from these privatization initiatives. 
 
The first stage of mass privatization - the distribution of shares among employees of industrial 
enterprises - was conducted via voucher auctions (Woodruff, 2004). Having control over 
enterprise cash flows, managers had an irrefutable advantage in these auctions. The 
stockholdings created were transferable and were owned by individuals rather than collectively. 
The scale of equity transfer offered to managers and employees through voucher privatization 
was enormous - more than in any other privatization programme ever undertaken. 
Approximately 20,000 large and medium-size enterprises were under the privatization scheme 
by the end of 1992 (Schroder, 1999).  
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Privatization was mandatory under the law, and enterprises were given 60 days to form public 
companies. Within this period they had to formulate and submit their privatization plan to the 
regional privatization agency and to transform their juridical entity into an open joint-stock 
company. According to the original 1991 privatization plan, managers and employees (insiders) 
would be offered a free distribution of shares, but with no guarantees for insider dominance. 
These rules however changed a year later when the privatization programme (1992) offered three 
schemes of privatization for middle and large-size enterprises (see Table 3) which provided 
significant advantages to insiders. Depending on which option an enterprise chose (closed 
subscription or through special stock auctions) insiders could obtain from 25% to 50% of the 
firm’s assets, with larger holdings having correspondingly higher prices (Flemming et al., 2000).  
 
The first option, which seemingly allowed up to 25% of shares to be obtained by workers for 
free, also imposed an upper limit equal to 20 minimum monthly salaries per worker, which 
consequently restricted the portion of freely distributed or discounted shares. Having analysed a 
sample of 87 industrial enterprises that were privatised during 1992 to 199314, we find that the 
actual stake of freely distributed shares transferred to workers’ collectives was 10.1% on 
average, with half of the cases less than 4.2% (Table 2). 
                    Table 2. Stake transferred to employees in a sample of 87 companies 
Stake <5% 5-10% 10-25% 25% 
Number of Companies 48 7 3 29 
 
Not surprisingly option 2, under which management and workers could buy the controlling share 
(51%) of stock at a significant discount, proved to be the most popular: according to Boycko et 
al. (1995) and Lieberman and Rahuja (1995), between 70% and 80% of enterprises chose this 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Federal Law No. 1992-1 of the Russian Federation of December 6th, 1991; Decree No. 1148 of the RF President 
of December 4, 1997, 'On Presidential Decrees on Privatization '.  
14 Data from Interfax-SPARK Database. 
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method of privatization. The choices for option 1 and option 3 were only 21% and 1% 
respectively. The popularity of option two reflected the fears of insiders that external buyers 
(outsiders) could obtain a majority stake and exert pressure on managers to undertake 
restructuring, thus threatening their positions. 
Table 3. Schemes of privatization processes in Russia in the early 1990s 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 315 
 “Workers’ collectives” were entitled 
to obtain 25% of non-voting 
preferred shares at no charge. 
However, the total value of the stock 
should not exceed the worth of 20 
minimum monthly salaries per 
worker 
 
 Funds corresponding to 10% of the 
chartered capital from selling the 
remaining shares at open voucher 
auctions would be deposited in a 
special privatisation account (fund), 
from which they could be used for 
purchase of further shares  
  
 An additional 10% of common 
shares could be bought by workers at 
a 30% discount on the nominal price, 
but not for more than 6 minimum 
salaries per worker, on a 3-year 
instalment plan with the initial 
payment of not less than 25% 
  
 Enterprise managers were offered to 
purchase 5% of common shares at 
the nominal price, but not for more 
than 200 minimum monthly salaries, 
and an additional 10% was to be 
deposited in a special development 
fund 
 
 21% of shares was assumed to be 
reserved by the regional property  
funds  
 
 Remaining shares (not less than 
29%) would be sold on securities 
markets within 6 months 
   
 “Workers’ collectives” 
could purchase 51% of the 
common shares at the 
nominal price multiplied 
by a coefficient of 1.7. 
However, 50% of the 
payment had to be made 
via privatisation vouchers.  
  
 Another 5% of common 
shares could be deposited 
in a special privatisation 
account (fund) 
 
 21% of shares would be  
reserved by the regional 
property  funds  
 
 Remaining shares (not less 
than 29%) would be sold 
on securities markets 
within 6 months 
 “Workers’ collectives” that  
mandated to implement 
restructuring  had an option 
to purchase 20% of the stock 
in common shares at the 
nominal price a year later 
 
 Another 20% of common 
shares could be purchased by 
workers with a 30% discount 
on the nominal price (but 
they could not spend more 
than 20 minimum monthly 
salaries per worker), which 
could be paid in instalments 
within 3 years 
 
 Not less than 29% would be 
sold on securities markets  
 
 Remaining shares would be  
reserved by the regional 
property  funds  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The third option was applicable only to enterprises with more than 200 workers and assets of 50 million roubles 
(in 1991 prices). 
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To compensate for the fact that insiders had an advantage in acquiring shares, the government 
offered the remaining stock (not less than 29% of all shares) for sale at public auctions through 
investment vouchers16. These vouchers, issued free to all citizens, had a nominal value of 10, 000 
roubles (in January 1992 prices) and could be used to place bids for shares in auctions. This plan 
was not successful. Due to high inflation (see Figure 1) the value of the vouchers, which had 
been distributed well in advance of the auctions, dropped significantly. The result was that most 
citizens remained outside share ownership, while large blocks of vouchers were accumulated by 
speculators to be used later on to strengthen insider dominance. 
 
 
Under the presidential decree #786 of August 1993, the minimum portion of shares intended to 
exchange for vouchers was increased from 35% to 80%. In addition, the workers’ collectives 
were given the right to reserve company stock for further distribution among employees in the 
buyout process and to sell remaining stock to outside investors not only for vouchers but also for 
cash. As a result, up to the end of 1993 privatization was accompanied by wide-spread buy-outs 
of shares by managers from employees. The buy-out price was set as a capitalized sum of rental 
payments, which due to hyperinflation (in 1992-93 inflation was running 14% per month) quite 
often turned out to be only a nominal figure. In most cases the privatization of large enterprises 
                                                 
16 Presidential decrees on 31 December 1992 #1705 “On public participation in voucher auctions” and 11 June 1994 
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Figure 1.  Inflation dynamics in Russia from 1992 to 1999 (% per month) 
Source: Entov R.M. (1999), “Modeling of Financial Data”. IET, Moscow, p. 59 
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led to control being retained by the previous management having a controlling equity, while the 
employees held only minority ownership rights. The outcome of this phase of privatization was 
the formation of 100% employee-owned limited liability partnerships or private limited 
companies. 
 
During this stage of mass privatization, 30% of shares were sold through commercial bidding, 
31% and 29.5% correspondingly through sales of shares to workers’ collectives and buyout of 
leased assets, 6.3% at voucher auctions and the remaining shares were sold through investment 
tenders.17 Estimates suggested that by July 1994 about 40 million citizens had become 
shareholders in former state-owned enterprises comprising approximately 80% of the country’s 
industrial output and accounting for 75% of the national labour force (McCarthy & Puffer, 2004; 
Buck et al., 1998; Filatotchev et al., 1999). 
 
Although the statistics are unquestionably impressive the actual result of voucher privatisation 
was poor performance of former state enterprises due to lack of investment. Voucher 
privatisation neither contributed to the inflow of investments nor stimulated the accumulation of 
capital. State subsidies were eliminated, the new owners – managers and employees – did not 
have funds or motivation for restructuring. Rather than being reinvested in the companies or paid 
out as dividends to shareholders or taxes to the state, generated earnings were transferred to 
offshore accounts controlled by affiliates. Economic stagnation, fiscal crisis, hyperinflation, 
unemployment and a marked increase in inequality were the ultimate outcome of the public 
voucher stage of privatization. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
#1233 “On the protection of rights of investors”. 
17 Russian Statistics Yearbook (2003). State Statistics Agency. Moscow, 2003. Under privatization laws, the 
following methods for privatization were permitted: sales of shares; sale at auctions; sale through investment 
bidding; sale through commercial bidding; sale of assets of a bankrupt company or buyout of leased assets. 
Investment tenders linked the purchase of shares to a commitment of additional investment into an enterprise.  
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2.3.  Stage 3: Monetary Privatization 1994-1997 
The situation was exceedingly aggravated by the new programme of privatization that was 
adopted by the presidential decree # 1535 on 22 July 1994 and granted significant advantages to 
outsiders. The distinctive feature of the new programme was that privatization had to be 
conducted via voucher auctions or investment bidding only at market prices by actual cash 
payments. Thus, the assets had to be re-evaluated and sold at new prices; instalment sale 
contracts were restricted to three months (not three years, as before); additional benefits were 
granted to managers that could buy 5 percent of the stock equalling 2,000 minimum monthly 
salaries per person compared with 200 minimum previously. Consequently, the popularity of the 
first and the second methods of privatization increased, comprising correspondingly 37% and 
48% of all enterprises privatized in 1995. 
 
The money stage of privatization, seemingly oriented toward an inflow of new investments and 
the formation of so-called principal owners, merely launched the struggle for ownership and 
control. When control of a firm was acquired by an outsider, he either became a manager himself 
or appointed a ‘pocket manager’. Filatotchev et al. (1999) states that during 1995-1996, a 
substantial part of management was replaced: board members in a third of cases (33.5%) while 
managers in almost a quarter of cases (23.5%). Having become insiders, these new owners-
managers continued former self-enrichment practices at the expense of the enterprise, thereby 
abusing the rights of other shareholders. For example, various obstacles to shareholder access to 
voting or even exclusion of minority shareholders from attending shareholders’ meetings, share 
dilution18 by issuing additional stock to major shareholders or converting privileged shares into 
common ones if dividends were not paid became prevailing practice (Black et al., 2000). 
 
                                                 
18 Share dilution reduced the proportion of equity held by minority holders, thus weakening their voting power. 
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The series of abuses during the auctions19 made the situation even worse by accumulating more 
stock in the hands of insiders and leaving the general public out. This was possible since there 
was little regulation of these auctions and, even in cases of outright violations, the government 
was either unable to enforce the rules or favoured the insiders because of political ties or bribes.  
 
More than 16,000 enterprises took part in voucher auctions, with shares corresponding on 
average to 20% of the total capital sold (Hedlund, 2001). The remaining 80% of the capital either 
remained in the hands of the state or insiders (Lieberman et al., 1995). According to data from 
the State Property Fund, by 1995 insiders owned about 70% of the shares in the privatized 
enterprises, including 17% in the hands of managers (World Bank, 2004).  
Table 4 gives a comparison of different estimates for the distribution of ownership in 1994-1998. 
 
In the later stages of the privatization of natural monopolies many dubious corporate practices 
have taken place executing hostile take-overs through bankruptcy proceedings, transfer pricing, 
barring shareholders from exercising their voting rights at meetings, increasing charter capital 
and offering newly issued shares only to insiders. The abusive nature of these practices is well 
documented (see, for example, Black et al., 2000).  
                                                 
19 Auctions were often arranged in inconvenient locations, or announced too late for general participation. 
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Table 4.  Ownership structure of Russian joint-stock companies in 1994-1998 
 Nottingham 
University 
(UK)
20
  
Institute of 
Economy in 
Transition
21
 
Blasi J. et al
22
 Russian 
Economic 
Barometer
23
  
World 
Bank
24
  
 1994 1996 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 1994 
 
2000 1994 
.  Insiders, total  66 58 62 56 56 65 55 58 68 53 69 
- employees  44 43 53 43 40 56 39 40 55 35 48 
- managers  22 15 9 13 16 9 16 18 23 18 21 
Outsiders, total 22 33 21 33 34 22 33 33 20 42 20 
Corporate owners, total  10 23 11 20.7 25 - 23 25.4 10 23 - 
- banks, investment funds  - 7 - 7.5 - - 7 6.6 2.8 6.9 - 
- non-financial corporate 
owners  
10 3 - 3 - - 5 3.9 4.2 12.7 - 
- financial-industrial 
groups  
- 3 - 1 - - 1 2.6 3.5 3.4 - 
- other - 10 - 9.5 - - 10 12.3 - - - 
 Private owners 6 8 10 11 9 - 9 6 10 19 - 
 Foreign owners - 2 - 1 - - 1 1.6 - - - 
State  12 9 17 11 10 13 13 9 12 5 11 
 
In the loans-for-shares privatization scheme introduced by the Presidential Decree # 889 in 
August 1995 an authorised by the Federal Property Fund and the Ministry of Finance creditor – a 
private company or a group of companies that won an investment auction - would get the 
controlling interest in a large state enterprise as a security in exchange for loans to the federal 
                                                 
20 Survey conducted by Nottingham University comprises 88 privatized firms in Moscow, S-Petersburg, the Urals 
and Nizhny Novgorod in 1994; 4Q1995-1Q1996 – 312 enterprises from 12 sectors of the economy. Source: 
Afanasyev M., Kuznetsov P., Fominyh A., Korporativnoye Upravleniye Glazami Direktorata (Corporate 
Governance from the Directorate’s Viewpoint). Voprosy Economiki (Questions of Economy), 1997 (5), p. 87. 
 
21 Aggregated data based on surveys in 1994 -1996 conducted by the GosKomImuschestva RF (400 enterprises), 
Federal Commission on Securities (250 and 889 enterprises), IET (174 enterprises from all regions). Source: 
Radygin A., 1996 Sobstvennost’ i Integratsyonnye Processy v Korporativnom Sektore (Ownership and Integration 
Processes in the Corporate Sector. Voprosy Economiki (Questions of Economy), 2001 (5), p. 26-45. 
 
22 Surveys performed by J. Blasi’s group in 1994 (143 enterprises), 1995 (172 enterprises), 1996. Sources: Federal 
Commission on Securities, 1996в (4 quarter); Citied in Blasi J., Kroumova M., Kruse D. Kremlin Capitalism. 
Privatising the Russian Economy. Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 193.   
 
23 Surveys conducted by the REB in 1995 (138 enterprises together with IET), in 1997 - 139 (including 46 
enterprises from the previous year), 1999 г. - prognosis.  Source: Aukutsionek, Kapeliushnikov, Zhukov, 1998. 
 
24 Earle J., Estrin S., Leschenko L. Ownership Structures, Patterns of Control and Enterprise Behavior in Russia. In: 
Commander S., Fan Q., Shaffer M. (eds.) Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia. Washington, The 
World Bank, 1996. 
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government. Although the creditors had no power to sell shares, to issue securities, to receive 
dividends or to alter the legal status of the pledged companies, through the loans-for-shares 
scheme “assets [in 24 large industrial companies] estimated at more than $25 billion were 
privatized … for just $1.2 billion” (Blagov, 2002, p.2). For example, Norilsky Nickel was taken 
over by Interros group for a sum less than 170 million dollars. It has currently market 
capitalization more than 20 billion dollars which is nearly 100 times higher than its evaluation 
(see Appendix 3). 
  
The loans-for-shares scheme contributed to greatly strengthening the positions of bank-led 
“financial industrial groups” (FIGs) such as Inkombank Group, Most-Bank Group, SBS-Agro 
Group, Oneximbank Group, Menatep Bank Group, “Rossiysky Kredit” Group, etc. These groups 
would later have a profound political and economic influence on the development of Russian 
capital markets. 
 
The Federal Commission for Securities Markets was established by the Presidential Decree # 
1009 "On the Federal Commission for Securities Market" as of July 1, 199625 and the 
Presidential Decree "On the Concept for the Development of the Capital Market in the RF" of 
July 1, 1996 in an attempt to improve the investment climate. Despite of the adoption of the   
Federal Law “On Securities Markets in Russian Federation” (as of 22 of April 1996) and “On the 
Protection of Legitimate Rights of Investors” (# 1233 as of 11 of June 1994) there was no 
mechanism for their enforcement and they only hampered foreign and domestic investment. 
Oligarchic groups were perceived by some as reinforcing corruption and creating pressure for 
weak enforcement, thereby contributing to the non-enforcement of capital market laws. 
Accordingly, restrictions on foreign ownership of newly privatised enterprises were imposed as a 
result of the lobbying of powerful industry-based business groups (McCarthy & Puffer, 2004, 
                                                 
25 In addition to the Presidential Decree # 2063 "On measures aimed at state regulation of the securities market in 
the Russian Federation" of November 4, 1994 
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p.17) that emerged during this period.  As a result, the institutional infrastructure already in place 
proved inadequate to protect investor property rights. In fact the Law on Financial-Industrial 
Groups (#190-FZ as of 30 November 1995) accelerated the consolidation of ownership even 
more by further integrating banking and industry. This was the time when “the oligarchs took a 
decisive step from financial to real [industrial] wealth” (Hedlund, 2001, p.231) forming 
vertically integrated business groups that had grown enough “to become an economically and 
politically relevant factor” (Schroder 1999, p.966). Appendix 2 summarises the data on major 
financial-industrial business groups currently dominating the Russian economy. 
 
2.4.  Stage 4: Post-Privatization Ownership Concentration (1998-2005) 
Up to 1998, ownership concentration and consolidation of integrated financial and industrial 
structures have continued. At the same time, a series of legislative acts and regulations have been 
adopted to support the creation of a favourable investment climate and to protect investor 
rights.26 For instance, the authority of the Federal Commission on the Securities Market was 
enhanced through the adoption in March, 5 1999 of the Federal Law # 46-FZ “On the Protection 
of Rights and Legitimate Interests of Investors in the Securities Market”. This law provided a 
legal basis to penalize companies that violated disclosure provisions27 (OECD 2002, p.11). Some 
authors contend, however, that the rights of dominant owners were strengthened by the law, 
while the rights of minority stakeholders and creditors were significantly weakened (Medvedeva 
                                                 
26 The Resolution # 785 of the Government of the RF “On State Programme for Protection of Rights of Investors for 
1998-1999”of July 17, 1998; Clarification  NA4-731 “On Shareholders' Rights in Cases of Additional Share Issues”, 
of August 17, 1995 
27 In addition there were a number of FCSM acts to regulate the securities market such as: 
• FCSM Act of October 02, 1997 "On the establishing of a register practice for the owners of the title securities''; 
• FCSM Act of October 17, 1997 "On the trust management of the securities and funds to be invested"';  
• FCSM Act of October 16, 1997 "On the depository activities in the RF, establishment of the regulations and 
their further implementation'';  
• FCSM Act of November 16, 1998 " On established requirements for the trade organizers on the securities 
market of the RF"; 
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et al., 2003). The Federal Law 127-FZ “On insolvency” issued on January 28, 1998, which has 
been actively used by banks and industrial groups as a means to take over companies, is a good 
example of this. Parliament finally passed the bankruptcy bill in September 2002, even though 
the first draft had been vetoed by the president only one month before. The veto, however, made 
it possible to write into the law certain proposals of lobbyists representing big businesses, such 
as a paragraph allowing companies to pay off their debts when they were financially able to do 
so (Woodruff, 2004). As a result, instead of strengthening legislation on property rights, minority 
shareholder rights continue to be violated. 
The trend of the current period is a strengthening of the role of the state. 
 
3.  Privatization proceeds 
At the beginning of 1991 state-owned enterprises dominated the economy (see Figure 2). 
          Figure 2. Ownership of enterprises in 1991 and 2003 
         (Source: The Russian Accounting Chamber Report, 2004, in Russian)  
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According to Russian State Committee data (Analyz processov privatizacii gosudarstvennoy 
sobstvennosti v Rossiyskoy Federacii za period 1993-2003 Moscow, 2004) in 1992 there were 
349,381 registered state-owned enterprises with a total book value of 35.6 billion roubles and 
80,809 municipal enterprises with total assets of more than 24.1 billion roubles.28 During 1991–
                                                                                                                                                             
• FCSM Act of October 1999 "On rules for broker and dealer activities at the securities market of the RF". 
28 “Re-valuation of assets as of July, 1992”, Goskomstat, Moscow, 1992. 
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1992, 46,800 enterprises were privatized, in 1993 the number increased to 88,600 and in 1994 to 
112,600. The overall dynamics of privatization in the period 1992-2003 is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Total number of privatised state-owned enterprises 
           (Source: The Russian Accounting Chamber Report, 2004 in Russian) 
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Approximately 96,400 state-owned enterprises had been privatized from 1993-2003. As can be 
seen from Figure 2 the proportion of state ownership had decreased significantly by 2003. By the 
end of 2004 some 1,500-2,500 enterprises were still state-owned. 
According to the Russian Accounting Chamber’s expert estimates (Figure 4), the total revenue 
received by the federal budget in years 1992-2002 exceed 146.0 billion roubles or $22.3 billion. 
Figure 4. Privatisation proceeds in 1995- 2003 
                   (Source: The Russian Accounting Chamber Report, 2004, in Russian) 
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As can be seen from Table 5 and Figure 5 the peculiarities of the last two privatization phases 
described above had a significant effect on the total volume of revenues generated from state 
ownership divestment. 
Table 5.  Proceeds from privatization in Russia 1993-2003 
(Source: The Russian Accounting Chamber Report, 2004 in Russian) 
 
Years  Budget  
(billion roubles) 
Actual Revenues  
(billion roubles) 
Percentage  
(%) 
1993 54.0 66.2 122.6 
1994 1,244.91 116.02 9.3 
1995 8.8 4.8 54.2 
1996 12.4 0.8 6.7 
1997 4.2 18.8 447.6 
1998 8.1 15.3 188.9 
1999 - 8.5 – 
2000 21.0 31.3 149.0 
2001 20.0 9.8 49.0 
2002 35.0 13.2 37.7 
2003 88.8 90.1 101.5 
Total 3 198.3 192.6 97.1 
               1 In 1998 prices  
               2 During 1993–1994 SOE privatization revenues included net income  
               3 Total amount does not include privatization proceeds in 1993 and 1994  
 
 
Figure 5. Ratio of privatization proceeds to federal budget revenues 1995-2002 
(Source: The Russian Accounting Chamber Report, 2004 in Russian) 
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There is insufficient data available today to calculate the real value of enterprises at the time of 
privatization, so we compare with World Bank data which shows the actual proceeds from this 
process with the market value of the companies as of March 2005. Appendix 3 contains data on 
the estimated government proceeds from privatization transactions that were carried out in 
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Russia between 1993 and 2003. Proceeds are defined to include all monetary receipts to the 
government resulting from transactions involving partial and full divestitures, concessions, 
management contracts and leases. Only those transactions that generated revenue for the 
government from privatization or private sector participation in an existing state-owned 
enterprise are included. If we accept the appropriately discounted current rate for inflation (see 
Figure 1) as an indicator of the real value of enterprises at their privatization, it appears that most 
viable firms were sold at a fairly nominal liquidation price which significantly undervalued the 
companies. These prices were often determined by much earlier book valuations prior to the 
period of high inflation in the early 1990s.  Though the sales of state-owned enterprises have 
often been large in absolute size and as a fraction of GDP, the Russian government has in fact 
not enjoyed significant proceeds from privatization.  
4.  Institutions of Economic Governance 
After the break up of Soviet Union the government dismantled the old governance system which 
was set up to protect state property but was unable to respond in a timely fashion to the arising 
institutional demand for the protection of private ownership and its transactions. The private 
owners’ adaptive response to this was to turn to criminal groups. 
 
V. Volkov (2002) provides an extensive sociological study of Russian organised crime in the 
1990s and shows how these groups helped to sustain Russia’s private economy. He argues that 
Russian criminalisation represents “one of the possible institutional arrangements for the 
protection of private property rights and a form for a shadow system of arbitration” (p.18). 
According to Volkov, up to 70% of all contracts in the mid-1990s were enforced without state 
participation. During the period 1991-1995, the increase in the number of criminal groups 
engaged in violent entrepreneurship was directly proportional to the growth of the private sector 
of the economy. Their number rose from 952 in 1991, to 4,300 in 1992 and to 5,691 in 1993 
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(Volkov, 2002, p. 151) and continued to grow up to 2001, only recently starting to decline (Table 
6). 
  Table 6. Number of crimes during privatisation 
   (Source: The Russian Accounting Chamber Report, 2004 in Russian) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
           
Total number of crimes during 
privatisation  1086 1746 1758 1929 2751 3400 3700 3600 
Number of crimes considered by the 
courts 443 880 443 600 980 2000 2100 1859 
Indemnification, mln roubles       127 540 1700 783 2600 
 
The economic risks of conducting businesses in the mid-90s were enormously high. As the new 
market structures were growing at a speed much greater than that of institution-building, 
alternative mechanisms of protection and enforcement spontaneously evolved to compensate for 
this. The institutional vacuum was filled up by formal and informal private protection agencies 
and various semi-autonomous armed formations that were able to create order and enforce 
certain rules, thereby reducing uncertainty in economic exchange.  
  
By the late 90s the criminal groups achieved substantial control over privatised enterprises 
through the practice of resolving corporate disputes, debt recovery or offering cheap start-up 
loans and tax exemptions, which eventually allowed them to directly exercise control over their 
clients’ enterprises as legitimate shareholders. Some criminal groups found themselves bound by 
emerging formal rules of economic exchange that forced them to assume a more rational and a 
less risky pattern of behaviour. Currently they are moving in the direction of becoming legal 
businesses, complying with formal market economy rules, making capital investments and 
engaging in charitable activities. 
 
The process of ‘reforms’ in the 1990s has had many other dimensions, notably distorted financial 
markets and the steady flight of capital, but privatization remains the best illustration of how rule 
aversion came to dominate the officially proclaimed ambition of establishing the rule of law. To 
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help understand the transition of Russian reforms toward the rule of law we have listed      
(Figure 6) the laws  introduced from the mid 1980s according to Williamson’s hierarchy of 
institutional economics (Williamson, 2000; Dixit, 2004). Figure 6 illustrates the immense task 
which has been undertaken in the period after the break up of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 
delays in the introduction of appropriate laws, particularly at the level of economic activities 
(level 4) such as production, employment and financial market transactions, has led to excessive 
ownership concentration by oligarchic groups.  
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Figure 6. Current institutional environment and the institutions of governance 
 
Level 1          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 2 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Patrimonial’ society, common set of values and state ownership  
prior to breakdown of USSR 
 
Emergence of individual values 
Law on Private Cooperatives (1986) 
Law on State Enterprises (1987) 
Enterprise Law (1990) 
Law on Foreign Investments (1991, 1999) 
Law on Securities Markets (1992, 1996, 2002) 
Law on the Protection of Investors’ Rights in the Securities Markets (1992,  
1999, 2002, 2003) 
Law on Joint-Stock Companies (1995, 2001) 
Law on Foreign Trade Activity (1996) 
Law on Insurance (1998) 
Law on Limited Liability Companies (1998) 
Land Reforms (2001, 2005) 
Code on Corporate Governance (1990) Law on Central Bank (1991, 1994) 
Law on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity (1992) 
Law on Pledge (1992, 1996, 1998) 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1993) 
Law on the Notariat (1993, 1997)  
Law on Procuracy (1995) 
Law on Arbitrage Courts (1995, 1997, 1998, 2001) 
Criminal Code (1996, 2001) 
Law on Judicial System (1997) 
Law on Leasing (1998) 
Legal-Judicial Reforms (2001-2003) 
Law on Bankruptcy (2002) 
Special Programme for Developing the Insurance Market (2002) 
Administrative Reforms (2003) 
WTO-related Reforms (Customs Code 2003) 
Laws on Individual Labor Activity (1986) 
Law on Currency Market Regulation (Law on Currency Control 
1994, 2003) 
Tax reforms (1997, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
Labor Code (2001) 
Financial System Reform Framework (2004) 
Pension Reforms (Law on Private Pension Funds 2004) 
 
Embeddedness: 
 Informal institutions, customs, traditions, 
norms and religion 
100 to 1000 years 
Institutional Environment: 
Formal rules of the game—esp. property 
(polity, judiciary, bureaucracy) 
10 to 100 years 
Governance: play of the game – contract 
(aligning governance structures with 
transactions) 
1 to 10 to years 
 
Resource Allocation and Employment 
(prices and quantities; incentive alignment) 
Continuous 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper describes the approaches to privatization undertaken by the Russian government in 
the period 1986-2005 and examines their outcomes. This account may help to guide the 
management of future privatizations in transition economies. 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn regarding Russian privatization in the early 1990s. First, 
privatization in Russia proceeded largely without proper attention to the sequencing of reforms, 
the design of the institutional infrastructure, the strengthening of the financial sector and capital 
markets and wider macroeconomic liberalization (promoting competition, etc). The Russian 
government ignored several crucial points: (i) a comprehensive design for the privatization 
programme; (ii) institutional reforms; (iii) deregulation of the financial sector before 
privatization; (iv) the merits of a measured rate of privatization; and (v) comprehensive social 
programmes. The academic literature suggests that share issue privatization has a higher success 
rate (in terms of money raised) and a more positive impact on promoting the development of a 
liquid stock market than do either asset sales or the voucher privatization that took place in 
Russia. 
 
Secondly, privatization in Russia has been linked to powerful political and business interests and 
transparency and competitive bidding have not been achieved in the majority of cases. At the 
time of announcement of the public privatization programme it was already clear that a 
conscious political decision had been made to provide insiders with considerable benefits. The 
reformers claimed publicly that if insiders were not offered sufficient bribes, privatization would 
not be able to proceed (Blanchard & Layard, 1993, p. 5). The real reason behind this decision 
was that the “reform agenda was vested in a small circle of ‘transactors’ (whose) personal 
priorities came economically and politically to dominate the officially presented arguments” 
(Wedel, 1997, p. 68). Furthermore, their powers were sufficient to exclude the country’s 
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legislators from influence over the rules of the process of privatization. As a result, there was “no 
time to wait for necessary legislation, there was no consideration of fiscal revenues, and there 
was no room for strategic investors” (Hedlund, 2001, p. 232). The long-term consequences may 
turn out to be the serious ones and can only be understood in terms of the interactions of legal, 
economic and political forces. 
 
Our institutional economics analysis of the Russian reforms covering the period 1986-2005 
highlights the importance of the ‘embeddedness’ level of informal institutions by which inertia 
has ‘a lasting grip on the way a society conducts itself’. On the other hand, it does show that the 
transition to a rule of law society has started, if somewhat piecemeal and in a random order.  The 
biggest challenge faced by Russia currently is not the lack of laws, but the existence of “loop-
holes” in the legal system that allows the seizure of property and suppression of information 
about companies. 
 
The analysis undertaken in this paper allows us to conclude that Russia’s rapid transition to a 
market economy through privatization led to highly concentrated ownership structures in an 
undeveloped institutional environment. The individual performance of selected Russian firms 
with respect to their ownership structure, sources of financing and governance may provide some 
hindsight with regard to an assessment of privatization and this is the topic of our current 
research. In future papers we hope to address the current desire of Russian corporations for 
global scope and legitimacy and its consequences for the Russian economy. 
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Appendix 1.  First commercial banks in Russia (1988-1989) 
(Source: The Bank of Russia official website http://www.cbr.ru/credit)  
Bank name Registration 
Number 
Date of 
Registration Status 
International Moscow Bank (Moscow)  N1 20.10.1989  
Closed JSC Commercial Bank "Viking"(S-Petersburg) N2 26.08.1988  
Moscow Commercial Bank "Premier"  N3 29.08.1988  
Commercial Bank "Credit-Moskva" N5 21.09.1988  
Interregional Credit Bank "Continent" N11 11.10.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Comercial Bank "Saniya" N14 28.10.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Financial Credit Society "Moscow Commercial Bureau" N15 26.01.1993 licence was withdrawn 
AMBI-Bank  N17 01.11.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank "Stroykredit" N18 05.11.1988  
Commercial Bank "Simbioz" N19 05.11.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Primorsky Regional Commercial Bank N21 10.11.1988  
INKOMBANK (Commercial Bank of Innovations)  N22 11.11.1988 licence was withdrawn 
AVTOVAZ Bank (OJSC) N23 16.11.1988 licence was cancelled 
International Commercial Bank "Vostok" N26 23.11.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank on Development of Building Materials Industry N29 29.11.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Vologda Commercial Bank "Severny" N33 19.11.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Cooperative Bank "Garant"  N34 22.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Moscow Bank of Innovations N35 28.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
"Aeroflot" Bank N36 27.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
S-Petersburg Bank of Innovations  N37 27.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank on Development of Petrochemical Industry "Neftekhimbank" N38 28.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Novosibirsk Bank of Innovations N39 28.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Bank of Innovations and Social-Economic Technologies  N40 28.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Bank "MENATEP" N41 29.12.1988 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank "Finist-Bank" N42 05.01.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Kaluga Bank of Innovations N43 13.01.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank of Chemical Industry "Khimbank" N46 18.01.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Chelybinsk Commercial Bank "ROTOR" N48 20.01.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank "Start-Bank" N49 20.01.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank of Scientific and Techological Advance  "Progress-Bank" N51 20.01.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Energomashbank (Bank on Development of Power Machine-building Industry) N52 20.01.1989  
Bank "Aleksandrovsky" N53 20.01.1989  
Moscow Bank "Tempbank" N55 24.01.1989  
Bank of Consumers' Cooperation N56 02.02.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Voronezh Commercial Bank "Energia" N57 03.02.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Commercial Bank "SBS-AGRO" N61 14.02.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Bank "Eleksbank" N62 15.02.1989 licence was withdrawn 
Chelyabinsk Commercial Bank "Forum-bank" N63 16.02.1989 licence was withdrawn 
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Appendix 2.  Major private financial-industrial business groups 
(Source: The World Bank official website http://rru.worldbank.org/themes/privatization.html) 
Financial-
Industrial 
Group 
Ultimate 
Owner/ 
Beneficiaries 
Banking 
Holdings 
Flagship 
Company 
Sales, RUR Employ-
ment 
Gazprom A. Miller Gazprombank Gazprom 870,815,385,000 247,800 
Lukoil V. Alekperov, 
Kukura, 
Maganov  
PetroCommerzb
ank, 
Sobinbank, 
Bank “NIKoil” 
Lukoil 474,973,216,000 136,868 
Sibneft Abramovich, 
Shvidler 
 Sibneft/Milhouse 202,629,008,000 168,554 
Surgutneftegaz Bogdanov Surgutneftegazb
ank 
Surgutneftegaz 163,129,392,000 65,325 
Interros Potanin, 
Prohorov 
 
Rosbank,  
MFK-Bank 
Norilsky Nikel 137,194,080,000 
 
111,692 
Renova 
 
Blavatnik, 
Balaeskul 
Vekselberg 
 Renova/Access 
Industries 
 
121,121,744,000 
 
94,047 
Avtovaz 
 
Kadannikov Avtovazbank Avtovaz 
 
111,593,552,000 
 
167,223 
Alpha-Group 
 
Petr Aven, 
Mikhail 
Fridman, 
GermanKhan, 
Kuzmichiyov 
Alexey (77%) 
 
Alfa-Bank Golden-Telecom, 
Vimpelcom, TNK, 
Onako, Sidanco, 
Slavneft, 
Perekrestok  
106,713,016,000 
 
38,490 
Severstal 
 
Mordashov 
 
 Severstal 
 
78,224,152,000 
 
121,901 
MDM 
 
Andrey 
Melnichenko, 
Sergey Popov, 
Pumpiansky 
MDM-Bank,  
MDM-Bank 
S.Pet.,  
MDM-Bank 
Ural 
Trubnaya 
Metallurgicheskaya 
Companiya,  
Sibirsko-Uralskaya 
Metallurgicheskaya 
Companiya,  
companies in coal-
mining and 
chemical industries  
70,276,496,000 
 
143,437 
BaseElement 
 
Oleg Deripaska Avtobank-
Nikoil, Bank 
“Soyuz” 
BaseElement, 
RusSKIY 
Aluminiy,  
RusPromAvto 
(Gaz, Paz, Liaz), 
companies in 
timber-processing 
industry   
64,825,452,000 
 
168,966 
Magnotigorsk 
steel 
 
Rashnikov 
 
 Magnotigorsk 
steel 
 
57,199,712,000 
 
56,892 
Evraz 
 
Abramov 
 
 Evraz 
 
52,412,024,000 
 
101,091 
Tatneft 
 
Tahaudinov  Tatneft 
 
40,611,844,000 
 
41,046 
Novolipetsk 
steel 
 
Lisin 
 
 Novolipetsk steel 
 
38,951,240,000 
 
47,326 
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UGMK 
 
Makhmudov, 
Kazitsin 
 UGMK 
 
33,221,580,000 
 
74,933 
Mechel 
 
Ziuzin 
 
 Mechel 
 
30,854,502,000 
 
53,932 
Sistema 
 
Evtushenkov, 
Novitsky, 
Goncharuk 
 
Bank of 
Moscow, 
MBRD, MIB 
AFK “Sistema”, 
Oil company  
 
26,946,746,000 
 
  20,272 
 
IlimPulp 
 
Smushkin, 
Zingarevich 
 
 IlimPulp 
 
20,439,996,000 
 
41,698 
Wimm-Bill-
Dann 
 
Yakobashvilli, 
Plastinin, 
Dubinin 
 
 “WimmBillDann” 
 
20,254,446,000 
 
12,704 
 
Metalloinvest 
 
Oleg Soskovetz, 
Ivanishvili, 
Gindin 
Metalloinvest-
bank 
 
Metalloinvest 
 
15,113,239,000 
 
35,935 
 
OMZ 
 
Bendukidze, 
Kazbekov 
 OMZ 
 
10,265,729,000 
 
35,384 
 
Vneshtorgbank
/ 
Guta Group 
 Guta-Bank, 
Tverbank, 
Lipetsky 
Regional Bank, 
Sverdlovky 
Gubernsky Bank 
“Rot-Front”, 
“Krasny Oktyabr”, 
“Concern 
Babaevsky” 
  
UES  Anatoliy 
Chubais 
Evrofinans-
Mosnarbank 
UES of Russia  34,460,744,000 13,500 
Menatep 
Group 
Mikhail 
Khodorkovskiy 
Menatep 
S.Petersburg,  
Investment Bank 
“Trust” 
UKOS   
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Appendix 3. Proceeds from privatization in Russia between 1993 and 2003 
(Source: The World Bank official website http://rru.worldbank.org/themes/privatization.html) 
 Year Sector Name 
Proceeds 
(US$ 
million) 
Market 
capitalisation  
for listed 
companies as 
of May, 2006 
(US$ million) 
1991 
Manufacturing & 
Services Cemash 35   
1992 
Manufacturing & 
Services Novomoskovsky 50   
1992 
Manufacturing & 
Services Prestige Cruise 13   
1992 
Manufacturing & 
Services Uritski Manufacturing factory 25   
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services 5 timber enterprises 1   
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services Baltika 23 3,981 
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services Bolshevichka 6   
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services Era 24   
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services PO Novomoskovskbytkhim 50   
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services Uralmash Zavod 1   
1993 
Manufacturing & 
Services Zavod Imeni Likhacheva (Zil) 5   
1993 Other Red October 0   
1995 Energy Lukoil 35   
1995 Energy Lukoil 320 65,942 
1995 Energy Sidanko 130   
1995 Energy Surgutneftegaz 88 48,128 
1995 Energy Yukos 159 2,982 
1995 
Manufacturing & 
Services 
Novolipetssky Metallurgichesky 
Kombinat 31  13,437 
1995 Primary Mechel 13 3,122 
1995 Primary Norilsk Nickel 170 22,911 
1995 Infrastructure Mosenergo 23 6,229 
1995 Infrastructure Murmanskoye Parokhodstvo 4   
1995 Infrastructure Novorossiisk Sea Shipping Co. 23  857 
1996 Energy Gazprom 429 248,281 
1996 Energy Lukoil 131 65,942 
1996 Energy Sibneft .. 17,069 
1996 Energy Sidanco 21   
1996 Energy Tatneft 120 9,446 
1996 Energy Yukos 160 2,982 
1996 Infrastructure UES 330 24,824 
1997 Energy 
East Siberian Oil and Gas Company 
(VSNK) 20   
1997 Energy Eastern Oil Company (VNK) 875   
1997 Energy KomiTEK 156   
1997 Energy Nafta-Moskva 12   
1997 Energy Sidanko 130   
1997 Energy Slavnet 39 9,508 
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1997 Energy Tyumen Oil Company 820 39,617 
1997 Primary Norilsk Nickel 250 22,911 
1997 Infrastructure Svyazinvest 1,875   
1998 Energy Gazprom 660  248,281 
1998 Primary Kuzbassrazrezugol 55   
1998 Primary South Kuzbass 34   
1998 Infrastructure Vimpelcom 160 8,521 
1999 Energy Gazprom 660 248,281 
1999 Energy Neftochim 101   
2000 Energy Obneftegazgeologia 2   
2000 Energy Zarubezhneftegazstroy 0   
2000 
Manufacturing & 
Services Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Works 3   
2000 
Manufacturing & 
Services Kolomina Locomotive Plant 4   
2000 Primary Chita Mining Co 12   
2000 Primary Kenotek 4   
2000 Primary Khakasskaya Mine 0   
2000 Primary Khakasugol 1   
2000 Primary Kuznetskugol Mining Company 2   
2000 Primary Sokolovskoye 2   
2001 Energy Onako 1,08   
2001 
Manufacturing & 
Services Moscow River Navigation 5   
2001 
Manufacturing & 
Services Plastik 1   
2001 Financial Avtovazbank 4   
2001 Financial Chelyabkomzembank 2   
2001 Financial Pyotr Pervy Bank 3   
2001 Financial Rosgosstrakh 8   
2002 Energy Nafta-Moskva 1   
2002 Energy Tatenergo 38   
2002 Primary Dalvostugol 30   
2002 Primary Kiselevskugol 1   
2002 Financial Khanty-Mansiisky Bank 32   
2002 Financial Vyatka Bank 1   
2002 Other Pavlovsky Engineering Plant 3   
2002 Infrastructure Solikamskaya HPP 12 14   
2003 
Manufacturing & 
Services Raevsky Sugar Plant 5   
2003 Primary Lenzoloto (gold mining company) 153   
2003 Primary OAO Aldanzoloto 15   
2003 Primary Rudnik Imeni Matrosova 34   
2003 Primary Vorkutaugol 28   
2003 Financial Roseximbank 28   
2003 Financial Rosgosstrakh 22   
2003 Other JSC Mechanical Plant 345 0   
2003 Infrastructure Arkhangelsk Marine Merchant Port 3   
2003 Infrastructure Pevek Sea Port Co 0   
 
